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Restitution For Life Salvage At Sea InThe Wake Of
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v.
Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc.
By Derek B. Jacobson*

In Peninsular& OrientalSteam NAavigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Car-

riers,Inc.,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
sitting in admiralty, devised a novel judicial remedy for the ancient
problem of the life salvor. For centuries admiralty law has rewarded
one who voluntarily saves property in peril at sea under the maritime
doctrine of salvage, but has denied remuneration to one who saves lives
but no property.2 This practice encourages salvage of property over life
when both are at stake and has long been heartily condemned by admiralty courts and legal commentators. In the instant case, owners of
S.S. CANBERRA, a hospital-equipped passenger liner, filed suit
against owners of the tanker S.T. OVERSEAS PROGRESS for the
costs of rescuing a heart attack victim aboard OVERSEAS PROGRESS. The trial court, following well-established American admiralty practice, treated the case as one of life salvage and denied
CANBERRA's claim for increased fuel costs.3 The Second Circuit reversed and framed a recovery for CANBERRA on principles of quasicontract.4 By avoiding "the questionable doctrine of 'pure life salvage' " and treating the claim as one for restitution, the Second Circuit
created a judicial remedy which could have a profound effect upon the
present role of life salvage in admiralty.
This Note will examine P&O in terms of the district court's opinion, which illustrates American admiralty law's traditional approach to
life salvage under common law and statute and which reflects the prevailing view in this country. The Note will then develop the proposition that the present life salvage statute, which is purportedly more
humane than the common law, improves the situation of the life salvor
only minimally. The Second Circuit's approach, which applies princi* A.B., 1975, University of California at Santa Cruz. Member, third year class.
1. 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 183 (1977).
2. An exception exists within the narrow limits of 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1970). See notes
53-85 & accompanying text infra.
3. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 418 F. Supp.
656 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), repld, 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 183 (1977).
4. 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 183 (1977).
5. Id. at 836.
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ples of restitution to life salvage, is a more satisfactory solution. The
solution proposed by the court will encourage the saving of life at sea,
offering potential salvors an action at law to recover, at minimum, their
salvage related expenses from the owners of the vessel in distress.
Facts in P&O
The facts giving rise to the claim for restitution in P&O were not
disputed.6 S.T. OVERSEAS PROGRESS7 was in mid-Atlantic Ocean
en route to Baltimore from Haifa, Israel when a ship's fireman, William Turpin, was stricken with chest pains suggestive of a heart attack.
The ship had no surgeon aboard.8 Medication administered by the
ship's officers failed to relieve Turpin's discomfort and on the following
evening he suffered another attack. Realizing that his vessel's resources
were inadequate to deal with Turpin's worsening condition, the captain
of OVERSEAS PROGRESS sent a radio message calling for responses
from all vessels in the vicinity with doctors aboard. Three ships answered the transmission, the closest of which was S.S. CANBERRA,9
then en route to New York from Dakar, Senegal. CANBERRA had a
maximum speed of 25 knots (approximately 28.8 mph) and was thus
considerably faster than OVERSEAS PROGRESS which had a maximum speed of only 13.8 knots (approximately 15.9 mph). CANBERRA, moreover, carried a fully equipped hospital and medical staff
able to provide Turpin with immediate medical attention.
In light of Turpin's increasingly serious condition and the proximity of CANBERRA, OVERSEAS PROGRESS directed a second
message to the British ship explaining the crewman's critical situation
and requesting an immediate rendezvous to enable transfer of the
crew member. Having agreed to aid OVERSEAS PROGRESS, CANBERRA altered course and proceeded to accomplish the rendezvous at
maximum speed. The meeting of OVERSEAS PROGRESS and CANBERRA was achieved in six and one-half hours; by comparison it
would have taken OVERSEAS PROGRESS fifty-seven hours to reach
the nearest shore hospital which was 740 miles away at St. John's,
Newfoundland.
6. For a complete account of the stipulated facts, see id. at 832-34.
7. S.T. OVERSEAS PROGRESS was an American flag tanker of approximately
13,030 gross tons, owned by Overseas Oil Carriers (Overseas), an American corporation with
its principal place of business in New York. Id. at 832.
8. Neither general maritime law nor statute requires a vessel, other than one transporting more than 50 steerage passengers, to carry a ship's surgeon. 46 U.S.C. § 155 (1970).
9. S.S. CANBERRA was a British flag passenger vessel of approximately 43,975 gross
tons owned by Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), an English limited liability company with its principal place of business in London. 553 F.2d at 832.
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In the course of their radio communication, the captains of the two
vessels briefly considered allocating the costs of the rescue effort, without attempting to reach an agreement. When the ships met, the two
men signed a letter,' ° written by CANBERRA's captain, which indicated an awareness of the problem but left the question of payment for
determination by the vessels' owners.
CANBERRA brought Turpin aboard and resumed course for
New York at maximum speed. Despite having travelled 232 extra
miles to oblige OVERSEAS PROGRESS, however, CANBERRA's
scheduled arrival in New York was delayed only two and one-half
hours. Turpin was treated at the United States Public Health Service
Hospital on Staten Island and eventually recovered. Overseas Oil Carriers, the owner of OVERSEAS PROGRESS, promptly paid $248 to
CANBERRA's surgeon for medical services rendered Turpin. P&O's
subsequent request for reimbursement, seeking $12,108.95 for Turpin's
nursing and accommodation, and, principally, for increased fuel costs,
was rejected. Overseas gratefully acknowledged CANBERRA's assistance but asserted that payment of P&O's claim was not in keeping with
"the traditional concept of rescue at sea."" In April 1974, P&O filed
suit.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting in admiralty, agreed with Overseas that the foregoing facts
stated a claim for "pure life salvage" and therefore denied P&O recovery except for an allowance of $500 representing the cost of the nursing
and accommodation provided by CANBERRA.12 The portion of the
court's judgment allowing for a recovery of Turpin's hospital expenses
was based on the court's construction of the admiralty doctrine of
10. The letter read: "I trust you understood my remarks on the R.T. when I came to
your assistance. I have to inform you that you should inform your owners that my company, P&O Steam Navigation Company, may look to them for reimbursement of diversion
costs, medical and out-of-pocket expenses. Would you please sign a copy of this letter to
indicate your understanding and receipt of this information." Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 656, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 553
F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 183 (1977).
11. In a letter to P&O's Passenger Division, Overseas' agent wrote: "Although we are
extremely grateful for the kind assistance you have rendeted Mr. Turpin, we must point out
that your claim does not appear to be in keeping with the norms and practices of the traditional concept of rescue at sea.
Indeed, we have on many occasions rendered similar aid at great risk to our crews and
vessels but have never entertained the thought of recovering our expenses.
We hope that our position will meet with your understanding and trust that you will
accept the assurance of our willingness to reciprocate in the unhappy event that the roles
should one day be reversed." Joint Appendix at 16a-17a, Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct.
183 (1977).
12. 418 F. Supp. at 659.
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maintenance and cure. 13 Under this doctrine, a shipowner is obligated
to provide medical care, food, and lodging to a crewmember injured or
falling ill in the service of the ship.' 4 The court reasoned that had
Turpin been placed in a shoreside hospital, OVERSEAS PROGRESS'
obligation to pay his maintenance and cure would have amounted to
$500.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
that part of the judgment which denied CANBERRA's claim for fuel
expenses. Construing the doctrine of maintenance and cure more expansively than did the trial court, the circuit court viewed the situation
in terms of Overseas' statutory obligation to provide medical attention
for its sailors, which it held would encompass transportation expenses
as well as nursing and accommodation. 16 The court reasoned that as
CANBERRA had performed OVERSEAS PROGRESS' duty to its
own crewman, Overseas had been unjustly enriched at P&O's expense,
and therefore P&O was entitled to restitution for its costs. 17 Judgment
was consequently entered for P&O in the sum of $8,500, representing
CANBERRA's fuel costs for her diversion and increased speed.'"
Overseas' petition for certiorari was subsequently denied by the United
States Supreme Court.' 9
P&O in the District Court
The federal district court's approach to the issues presented by
P&O fits squarely within the mainstream of American admiralty law.
The federal district court's opinion treated three distinct aspects of the
case: Overseas' contention that CANBERRA's service was merely noncompensable life salvage,2" P&O's quasi-contract claim,2 ' and the
court's limited finding of unjust enrichment on maintenance and cure
grounds.22
The issue of life salvage was successfully raised by Overseas at the
trial court level as a defense to CANBERRA's claim for reimbursement of medical and fuel costs incurred on behalf of OVERSEAS
PROGRESS.2 3 Judge Goettel, writing for the federal district court,
found "[t]his situation, while not the classic rescue at sea, does resemble
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
See text accompanying notes 104-105 infra.
418 F. Supp. at 659. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
553 F.2d at 834-36. See notes 104-107 & accompanying text infra.
553 F.2d at 834-36. See notes 101- 110 & accompanying text infra.
553 F.2d at 837 n.7.
98 S.Ct. 183 (1977).
See notes 25-26 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 87-94 & accompanying text infra.
See notes 95-97 & accompanying text infra.
418 F. Supp. at 657.
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life salvage, as it is possible that Turpin would not have survived a
fifty-seven hour trip to the nearest shore hospital [aboard OVERSEAS

PROGRESS]." '2 4 Like a "pure" salvage operation, Turpin's rescue

was effected by a volunteer, responding successfully to rescue a life im-

periled at sea. The courts have not adopted the position that saving a
life is in itself an independently compensable act of salvage without, at
minimum, a concurrent saving of property.25 Cognizant, therefore, of
the constraints of American admiralty doctrine, Judge Goettel held

that "If]or the present it would appear to be beyond the province of
this court to inaugurate a new policy deviating from the centuries old

common law doctrine. 2 6

Life Salvage: Common Law Precedent
The Second Circuit's reversal on appeal, and its importation of

quasi-contractual remedies into this area of admiralty law, can only be
appreciated against the backdrop of precedent which guided the district
court.

The doctrine of life salvage is a facet of the ancient law of salvage. 27 Salvage itself is a uniquely maritime service. 28 A volunteer
acting on land may rescue valuable goods from peril at great personal
hazard but may not detain the goods; at most, limited authority holds
the volunteer may sue the property owners on a quantum meruit basis. 29 Should the same order of service be performed at sea, however,
who successfully preserves, or contributes to the preservathe salvor
tion"0 of, a vessel in distress and its cargo, obtains a lien of high priority
24. Id. at 658.
25. See note 41 supra.
26. 418 F. Supp. at 660.
27. Salvage may be defined as "the reward allowed for a service rendered to marine
property, at risk or distress, by those under no obligation (independent of statute) to render
it, which results in a benefit to the property if eventually saved." R. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF
ADMIRALTY LAW

§ 63 (2d ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as

HUGHES].

Life salvage may be

defined as "a reward... . for saving human life in danger at sea." See Jarrett, The Ltfe
SalvorProblem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 779 n.3 (1954) (citing Dunlop, Life Salvage,
15 ScoT. L. Rnv. 44 (1899)).
28. HUGHES, supra note 27, § 62.
29. See, e.g., Corbin, Quasi-ContractualObligations, 21 YALE L.J. 533, 539 & n.30
(1912). "Compensation as salvage is not viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay, on
the principle of a quantum meruit, or as a remuneration pro opere et labore but as a reward
given for perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to seamen and others
to embark in such undertakings to save life and property." The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 1, 14 (1869) (Clifford, J.).
30. "Success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success," is an essential element of a salvage claim. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879).
Towing a derelict vessel closer to port, if that vessel is eventually salvaged, constitutes a
compensable salvage service. The Strathnevis, 76 F. 855 (D. Wash. 1896). Merely notifying the rescue vessel may constitute a compensable salvage service, in the event that the
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upon the vessel, cargo, and freight.3 1 The lien is made enforceable by
an admiralty court through the granting of a salvage award. 32 The

amount of this award is determined by a multitude of factors subject to
the discretion of the court, 3 3 and frequently includes the salvor's ex-

penses and damages incurred by the salving vessel. 34 The total award,

however, may not exceed the value of the property saved 35 and, today,
because of the extremely high value of ocean going vessels and cargo,
such awards will rarely exceed twenty percent of the value of ship and
cargo after salvage.36 Operating as a powerful inducement to seamen
and others to aid marine property in peril, the promise of a liberal salvage award promotes the orderly organization of a salvage effort, mini-

mizes commercial loss and discourages struggles, theft and outright
37
piracy in situations where police surveillance is rarely present.

vessel in distress is eventually preserved. The Annie Lord, 251 F. 157 (D. Mass. 1917); M.
NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE § 91 (1958) [hereinafter cited as NORRIS].
31. NORRIS, supra note 30, § 147. See note 21 supra.
32. NORRIS, supra note 30, § 301.
33. "Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circumstances as the main ingredients in determining the amount of the award to be decreed for a salvage service: (1.)
The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service. (2.) The promptitude,
skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the property. (3.) The value
of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to which
such property was exposed. (4.) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property
from the impending peril. (5.) The value of the property saved. (6.) The degree of danger
from which the property was rescued." The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 13-14 (1869).
The resolution of these elements is left to the court's discretion. See G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 559 n.84a (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE &
BLACK], noting a doubled salvage award because "[a] stingy award to a salvor contravenes
good public policy," (citing Lago Oil & Transp. Co. v. United States, 232 F.2d 238, 240 (2d
Cir. 1956)).
34. NORRIS, supra note 30, § 211.
35. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, at 563. In The Waterloo, 29 F. Cas. 399
(S.D.N.Y. 1830), the court stated that if admiralty allowed greater awards for salvage than
the value of the property saved, "[clourts. . . would be reinstating the rule of nature, or
rather of barbarism, in devoting to the first finder whatever property the exigencies of the
owner had wrested from him or compelled him to desert." Id. at 403.
36. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, at 563-66. The authors point out
that all salvage awards granted in the United States are tabulated, with a short sketch of the
service rendered, in The Five Year Digests of American Maritime Cases, as well as in
NORRIS, supra note 30, appendix E. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, at 563 n.93.
Life salvage is much less profitable than property salvage. Consider, e.g., The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930), in which $5,000 of a $50,000 property salvage award was
granted to life salvors; The Esso Greensboro, 122 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Tex. 1954), in which
$4,000 of a $215,000 property salvage award, a mere two percent of the total, was granted to
the life salvors.
37. "[T]he general interests of society require that the most powerful inducements
should be held forth to men, to save life and property about to perish at sea, [and] they also
require that those inducements should likewise be held forth to a fair and upright conduct,
with regard to the objects thus preserved." Mason v. The Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
240, 267 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).
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Given the valuable commercial and humanitarian motives ad-

vanced by awards to salvors aiding ships in distress, and the historically
solicitous attitude of admiralty courts towards seamen, 38 it is all the
more anomalous that no equivalent incentive is held out to encourage
seamen to rescue their brethren at sea. On the contrary, the salvor's
humanity in saving life at sea has never been the object of a direct
award by way of salvage when a vessel is saved,39 although the danger

to the lives of those on board the distressed ship may be considered by
the courts to increase the property salvage award.1° At least one commentator has argued that the saving of life at sea is a compensable form
of property salvage. He reasons that the life salvor protects the ship-

owner from burdensome wrongful death claims for the death of crew

and passengers,4 1 but this reasoning has never been adopted by the
38. The United States from its earliest period has recognized the value of sailors as an
adjunct of foreign trade in times of peace and as an arm of military service in times of war.
"From the Act of July 20, 1790, 1 Stat. 131 to the. . . amendment of the Suits in Admiralty
Act, section 5, 46 U.S.C. § 745, 41 Stat. 525, Dec. 13, 1950, [t]he statute books are replete
with beneficial laws enacted to better the working and living conditions of American
seamen." 2 M. NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 546 (3d ed. 1970).
39. E.g., The George W. Clyde, 80 F. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1897), affd, 86 F. 665 (2d Cir.
1898); The Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me.
1840) (No. 4,834). See generally NoRiRs, supra note 22, at § 24.
40. See 68 AM. JuR. 2D Salvage § 10 (1973). Norris interprets the sixth criterion of
Justice Clifford's classic enumeration of the elements of salvage, note 25 supra, to read:
"The degree of danger from which the lives and property are rescued." NoRRIs, supra note
30, § 237 (emphasis added).
41. In Comment, Compensationfor Life Salvage at Sea, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (Spring
1951), the author points out a number of statutes which impose civil liability on American
shipowners: 46 U.S.C. § 491 (1970) makes the negligent shipowner liable for damages sustained to passengers in case of explosion, fire, collision, and other causes; 46 U.S.C. § 761
(1970) gives passengers' personal representatives a right of action against the shipowner for
wrongful death; 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) gives a seaman a right of action in case of injury,
and, in case of death, a right of action to the seaman's personal representative.
The author of the comment cited in the preceding paragraph recognizes that one reason
for disallowing "pure life salvage" in the absence of property salvage is admiralty's reluctance to unduly burden a shipowner with salvage payments though no property was saved.
Yet in many instances, he argues, "the contingent liability incurred by the owners where loss
of crew and passengers are involved would far exceed the cost to the owners of replacing the
vessel. The life salvor insulates the owner from this liability. In U.S. v. Cornell Steamboat
Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1906) the government was obliged to contribute to a salvor's award even
though it had only an intangible interest in the property. The Surpeme Court said that the
salvoes in personam remedy 'extends to one who has a direct pecuniary interest in such
property.' Ship operators are carriers owing a duty to their passengers and crew. They have
an insurable interest in their safety. They have to respond in money damages for negligence
in performing their duty. To this extent operators have a direct, pecuniary interest in their
passengers and crew. In this sense life salvors are protecting the operators' property when
they save lives. For this service they should be entitled to compensation even in the absence
of other property salvage." 2 HAsTINGs LJ. at 55 (Spring 1951).
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courts.

The reluctance of admiralty courts to order financial awards for

the independent saving of life is premised in part on a practical difficulty inherent in the in rem nature of the salvage libel.43 The salvor's
bounty depends on the attachment of the marine property saved;' a
salvor could hardly be allowed to hold the body of persons rescued at

sea until salvage was paid for their release.45 If money or jewelry were
discovered on the survivor, these valuables were subject to the in rem

property salvage proceeding, 46 but their owner, of course, was not.
Life salvors have never had a cause of action against the human beneficiaries of their service.4 7 Courts consider it to be, rather, the common

duty of humanity for one sailor to rescue another on the high seas. As
the district court concluded in the instant case, "Plaintiff is left...
with the recognition that its efforts were in keeping with the finest tra-

ditions of the sea.' '48 Unfortunately, although the moral reward for sav-

ing fellow humans at sea has been beyond the jurisdiction of earthly
courts to dispense, instances are legion where this higher reward has

proved ineffective to spur the saving of life at sea.4 9
42. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 418 F. Supp.
656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 183 (1977).
43. The term "libel" is equivalent to "complaint" and was utilized in admiralty practice when federal district courts had an admiralty "side" with a separate docket and separate
rules of procedure applicable to admiralty. Since 1966 the "sides" have been merged, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became generally applicable to maritime actions, and the
older terms became obsolete. A "libelant" is the older version of "plaintiff." See GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 33, at 2, 19.
44. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869). See generaly I M. NORRIs, THE
LAW OF SEAMEN § 213 (3d ed. 1970).

45. See Jarrett, The Lfe Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 781 (1954).
Slaves were an exception to this rule because they were property. See, e.g., The Mulhouse,
17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910). "Since slaves were regarded as property, their
salvors were granted awards (citations omitted), apparently without the courts' perceiving
that they were thus indirectly encouraging the saving of slaves in preference to freemen.
While this policy might have found favor in the eyes of the early abolitionists, it could
hardly have been the intention of the jurist or slave owner (sometimes the same person)."
Jarrett, The Lfe Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 784 (1954).
46.

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, at 539.

47. In re Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, 305 F. Supp. 796, 800 (D. Ore. 1969).
48. 418 F. Supp. at 660.
49. See, e.g., Warshaver v. Lloyd Sabaudo S.A., 71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1934); The Dr.
George J. Moser, Inc., 55 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1932); The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840)
(No. 4,434). The situation presented in The Emblem so shocked District Judge Ware that
he commented: "But, in the present case, there are some circumstances which, I am free to
say, have struck my mind with considerable surprise. They are, that this vessel should have
lain, for four days, in one of the most frequented parts of the American seas, with vessels
continually passing her, some of them almost within hailing distance, and when they were in
full view of this unhappy company, who were lying thus lashed and dying upon the wreck,
and no one came to their relief until more than half of their number were released from their
sufferings, by death, and consigned to a watery grave. . . . If this fact is to be taken as a just
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Life Salvage: Statute

The life salvor has long received more humane treatment in En-

glish admiralty courts than that afforded within the American system.
By giving the life salvor's claim statutory recognition in the British
Merchant Shipping Repeal Act of 1854,50 Great Britain became the
first maritime power to soften the rigor of the general maritime law

regarding life salvage. The Act declared that if life and property were
saved simultaneously by different salvors, the property salvor was obligated to share his award with the life salvor." Some forty years later,
this principle was adopted by the International Salvage Convention of

1910.52 The United States, as a party to this agreement, then promulgated the terms of the Convention into law in the Salvage Act of

1912. Presently the portion of the Salvage Act concerning life salvage,
codified as 46 U.S.C. § 729, provides: "Salvors of human life, who have

taken part in the services rendered on the occasion of the accident giving rise to salvage, are entitled to a fair share of the remuneration
awarded to the salvors of the vessel, her cargo, and accessories. 54 The

statute represents an improvement over the common law because it
provides remuneration for the saving of life without requiring the life

salvor to salvage property as well.
Maritime law has distinguished three situations which potentially
confront the life salvor: (1) the salvor saves life alone, (2) the salvor
saves both life and property, and (3) one set of salvors saves life and
measure of the humanity of the persons who frequent these seas, I know not but it may be
the part, not only of humanity, but of worldly wisdom, to let them understand that sometimes even in godliness there is gain, and to tempt them by the allurements of pecuniary
profit, if they can be led by no other, to acts of humanity and mercy." Id. at 612-13.
In a fictional context, Herman Melville characterized seafaring mores this way: "'Stick
to the boat, Pip, or by the Lord, I won't pick you up if you jump; mind that. We can't
afford to lose whales by the likes of you; a whale would sell for thirty times what you would,
Pip, in Alabama. Bear that in mind, and don't jump any more.' Hereby perhaps Stubb
indirectly hinted, that though man loved his fellow, yet man is a money-making animal,
which propensity too often interferes with his benevolence." H. MELVILLE, MOBY DICK ch.
XCIII (1851).
50. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104. See Jarrett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE
L.J. 779, 782 n.23, for the historical evolution of the English life salvage statute. Since the
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, English admiralty courts have recognized an independent right to claim a salvage award for lives rescued from a British vessel
anywhere, or from a foreign flag vessel if the act occurs in British waters. 57 & 58 Vict., c.
60, § 544. Although the life salvage award is accorded the highest priority against the owner
of the surviving vessel, where the surviving value is insufficient to satisfy the life salvor's
claim the life salvor may be rewarded out of a Merchantile Marine Fund as provided by
Parliament. 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, §§ 544-545.
51. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, § 459.
52. Salvage Convention of 1910, art. 9, reprintedin NoIus, supra note 30, at 514.
53. The Salvage Act of August 1, 1912, 46 U.S.C. §§ 727-731 (1970).
54. 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1970).
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another set saves property. In the third situation, section 729 attempts
to ameliorate the harshness of the life salvage doctrine by giving the
life salvor a "fair share" of the property salvor's award." Under this
statute, however, the first56 and second5 7 situations remain unchanged.
A review of the principal cases construing section 729 underscores
continuing judicial hesitation to reward the life salvor's effort even in
the limited situations to which it applies. The courts have tended to
focus on three considerations in deciding whether to grant life salvage
under the statute: first, was the life salvor faced with a choice to save
life or property; second, if the life and property salvage operations were
not simultaneous, how much time must have elapsed between the saving of life and the salvage of property before the life salvor's claim will
fail; and third, against whom or what did the life salvor's remedy lie.
When a salvor chooses to save life before property the courts have
shown a willingness to grant life salvage.5 8 Yet many claims are denied on the basis of a technical distinction which first crept into the law
5 9 In that case, the
in 1919 in the now well-known case, The Eastland.
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that
insofar as the purpose of the statute was to put rescue of life on a par
with property salvage, life salvage must apply where the salvor had a
choice to save one or the other.6" EASTLAND had sunk with great loss
of life in the Chicago River. Only the "magnificent and heroic efforts"' I of the life salvors prevented even greater catastrophe. Because
the salvors had manned small craft in the rescue effort, however, the
court found that statutory life salvage was unavailable, as the salvors
were incapable of saving EASTLAND itself. Determining that the
rescuers had never been faced with a choice to save property before
life, the court stated that the salvors were simply fulfilling a moral
duty.6 2 Although the court's language in The Eastlandwas dictum because the libelants had not filed their claim until the two year statute of
limitations had run,63 that case has been cited for the proposition that,
55. Although the United States has gone no further than the 1912 Salvage Act, it
should be noted that Great Britain has by statute granted an independent right to claim a
life salvage award which may be satisfied out of a Mercantile Marine Fund if no property is
preserved. 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60, §§ 544-545.
56. See notes 39-49 & accompanying text supra.
57. See note 40 & accompanying text supra.
58. See, e.g., Strachan Shipping Co. v. Cities Serv. Ref. Transp. Co., 42 F.2d 524
(E.D.S.C. 1930); Petition of Esso Shipping Co., 122 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
59. In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill.
1919).
60. Id. at 539-40.
61. Id. at 536.
62. "What they did was inspired by the spirit which since Christendom has been the
foundation of the great brotherhood of mankind. . . .Their reward they have; it can never
be taken from them, and it is measured by a standard greater than money." Id. at 540.
63. 46 U.S.C. § 730 (1970).
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for the statutory remedy to apply,' a salvor must choose to save lives
before property and have the capacity to do both.
As recently as 1970 the District Court of Hawaii used The
Eastland'sreasoning to deny life salvors' claims in Saint PaulMarine
Transportation Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp.65 In that case M.V. SAINT
PAUL, following its rescue of S.S. NORTH AMERICA's crew, was
unable to take the distressed ship in tow and thus was not entitled to an
award because it had not been faced with a choice to save life before
property.6 6 The court worked some justice for SAINT PAUL, nevertheless, when it found her crew had performed valuable salvage service
by extinguishing some smoldering fires aboard NORTH AMERICA.
Since a salvage service need only contribute to the eventual recovery of
the property to merit compensation, the court granted a salvage award
on the basis of the incidental benefit to the ship. In view of the generous salvage award granted, however, it seems highly probable that the
court, in fixing the award, was swayed by SAINT PAUL's rescue of
NORTH AMERICA's crew.6 7
Where life salvors are in a position to save life before turning to
more profitable salvage, courts will reward the life salvor under the
terms of the statute. In The Shreveport,6 8 decided in 1930 by the District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, the tug ALDECOA rescued SHREVEPORT's crew from lifeboats. Since some
of the crew were badly burned, ALDECOA put ashore as quickly as
possible without attempting to tow or otherwise salvage SHREVEPORT. Instead, MARINER'S HARBOR performed this service five
hours later. Despite the latter's assertion that ALDECOA's acts were
so disconnected in point of time as to disallow remuneration, 69 the
court held that since ALDECOA had "foregone an opportunity" to do
more profitable work,
[t]he statute should be liberally construed with the humane object in
view ....
Life salvors, even though acting independently of the
property salvors, are entitled to share in the award, provided their
services are rendered on the occasion of the accident giving rise to
salvage.70
64. See The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930); Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp.
v. Cerro Sales Corp., 313 F. Supp. 377 (D. Hawaii 1970).
65. 313 F. Supp. 377 (D. Hawaii 1970).
66. Id. at 379.
67. 332 F. Supp. 233 (D. Hawaii 1971), affd, 505 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1974). The
salvage award to SAINT PAUL's owners and crew totaled $194,070.40. Id. at 1121-22.
See note 40 supra.
68. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Cities Serv. Ref. Transp. Co., 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C.
1930).
69. Id. at 537.
70. Id. at 538.
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In The Shreveport, the statute provided a reward for ALDECOA where
the maritime common law, requiring some form of property salvage,
would not.
A second major consideration in a court's decision to grant statutory life salvage concerns construction of the phrase "rendered on the
occasion of the accident giving rise to salvage."'" In The Eastland 72
this phrase was construed in dictum 7 3 to require salvage of life while
the property was still at risk and could be saved." Although EASTLAND was eventually raised eleven days after the disaster, the act of
salvage performed under contract was found to be unrelated to the acts
of the life salvors.75 Other courts, however, have taken a different
view. In The Annie Lord,7 6 the libelant rescued the crew of the waterlogged LORD and attempted to tow the vessel into port. Inclement
weather caused the tow to be abandoned and LORD was subsequently
salvaged by other vessels. Although the rescue and the conclusion of
the salvage operation were separated by two days, the Massachusetts
district court awarded life salvage to the libelant. The court based the
award on a finding that libelant had contributed to the salvage of ANNIE LORD by towing the schooner closer to port.7 7 In The
Shreveport,78 some five hours elapsed between ALDECOA's rescue of
SHREVEPORT's crew and the arrival of MARINER'S HARBOR to
tow SHREVEPORT. The court stated that five hours was not enough
time to cut off ALDECOA's claim. In sum, there is little guidance
offered by judicial interpretation of the language of the statute regarding the meaning of "rendered on the occasion of the accident." This
lack of definition continues to be a point of controversy in life salvage
litigation.7 9
71.
72.

46 U.S.C. § 729 (1970).
262 F. 535 (N.D. IUI. 1919).

73.

See note 63 & accompanying text supra.

74.

"When the services of the life salvors were rendered, the steamer had already set-

tled safely in the mud at the bottom of the river. .

.

.The efforts of the life salvors were

directed solely to saving from drowning the passengers and crew. . . .There was nothing to
distract those salvors from their humane purpose. The statute, I think, presupposed possibly a divided interest, and probably a sordid interest, in the average salvor. . . .The statute
• . .presupposed an emergency where both lives and goods were at hazard, and aimed to
encourage the saving of life. It is a sad reflection to contemplate this law."
(Carpenter, D.J.).
75. Id. at 541.
76. 251 F. 157 (D. Mass. 1917).

77.
78.

Id. at 539-40

Id. at 159-60. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Cities Serv. Ref. Transp. Co., 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C.

1930). See notes 68-70 & accompanying text supra.

79. See, e.g., Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 313 F. Supp. 377,
379 (D. Hawaii 1970), wherein a period of eight days effectively cut off the life salvors'
claims.
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A third important factor that may frustrate a life salvage claim is
the issue of against whom or what the salvor's remedy lies. The usual

property salvage remedy is an in rem right which accrues for service to

the vessel."0 Admiralty has been reluctant to allow maritime liens on a
vessel for services rendered to its passengers unless those services were
closely related to the vessel salvage.8 ' The statutory life salvage rem-

edy has therefore been an in personam action against the recipients of
the salvage award.82
The problem of a defectively applied libel was addressed by the
Second Circuit in The Dr. George J Moser, Inc.83 There the libelant
proceeded for life salvage in rem against ROCKEFELLER but the

court interpreted section 729 as providing for a share in the awards
made to other salvors who had participated in the property salvage and
not as permitting the life salvor to seek a recovery against the ship itself.84 The libel for life salvage against ROCKEFELLER was therefore dismissed. 5
80. See notes 28-37 & accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 71-79 & accompanying text supra.
82. Aside from the traditionally distinct treatment accorded salvors for services to the
vessel as opposed to services to passengers, see notes 27-49 & accompanying text supra,
admiralty courts realize that ships are of their greatest value economically when they are
continuing their voyage, not when they are tied up in litigation. An in personam action for
life salvage obviates these problems so far as the ship is concerned. Comment, Compensationfor Life Salvage at Sea, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 54-55 (Spring 1951).
83. 55 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1932).
84. Id. at 905. MOSER, a tug, was one of nineteen vessels involved in a salvage operation when the steamer WILLIAM ROCKEFELLER exploded at its wharf. While salvage
was underway MOSER left the scene to carry a critically injured seaman to an ambulance.
This act was performed, after a twenty minute delay, at the request of another tug which had
the injured man on board but was fastened to ROCKEFELLER inboard of MOSER.
When MOSER returned to the scene of the operation many other vessels were assisting the
effort but MOSER stood by and continued to help as directed. In the subsequent libels for
salvage and life salvage, the lower court denied MOSER's in rem claim against ROCKEFELLER. Id. at 904. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the respondents argued that
MOSER's reluctance to transfer the wounded man aboard precluded its participation in the
salvage award. The court, however, recognizing MOSER's dilemma, the profitability of
property salvage as against the uncertainty of life salvage, granted MOSER a small salvage
award on the basis of a minimal contribution to property salvage. The court pointed out
that it was rather the duty of the tug having the injured man on board to care for him and
that "[i]n the contest in inhumanity, if there was one, the NO. NINETEEN [the inboard tug]
has the unenviable victory." Id. at 905.
85. Id. at 905. Further limiting the life salvor's right to proceed in rem against the
recipients of a salvage award, the Oregon district court in In re Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, 305 F. Supp. 796 (D. Ore. 1969), held that the in personam proceeding does not include
the right to proceed against an amount paid to a property salvor under contract salvage.
Contract salvage is salvage pursuant to an agreement entered into by the salvors and the
owners of the property in peril. The contract fixes the amount of salvage, thus precluding
the court from fixing a discretionary award. See generally NoRMs, supra note 30, at §§
159-79.
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In sum, the present life salvage statute has advanced the life salvor's legal position in American admiralty court only marginally.
Courts may increase an award for the most minimal salvage service if
lives are saved, but this is no more than the traditional discretion permitted a court in fixing a salvage award. Where the life salvor did not
perform property salvage, admiralty courts have focused on three other
factors to determine the life salvor's eligibility for a statutory share of
the property salvage: first, did the life salvor make a choice to save life
when property was at risk; second, was the life salvor's effort sufficiently simultaneous with the property salvage operation; and third, did
the libelants correctly proceed in personam against the recipients of the
salvage award. Only the third of these criteria commands a consensus
among the district courts.
Plaintiff's quantum meruit and quasi-contract claim
In response to plaintiffs argument that it was not seeking a reward
for its services but merely reimbursement via quantum meruit or quasicontract, the district court in P&O 86 noted that such a distinction between salvage and restitution had not been recognized by American
admiralty, 7 the evident inequities of the case notwithstanding. 8
Quoting from Miller v. Schloss,8 9 the court distinguished the two types
of implied contracts:
A contract cannot be implied infact where the facts are inconsistent
with its existence; or against the declaration of the party to be
charged;. . . The assent of the person to be charged is necessary and
unless he has conducted himself in such a manner that his assent
may fairly be inferred he has not contracted.
A quasi. . . contract rests upon the equitable principle that a person
shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. . . It is an obligation which the law creates .... 90
In considering the quantum meruit claim, the court found that the
letter signed by both captains at the time of Turpin's transfer 9 1 was not
a demand for payment sufficient to imply a contract because it left the
question of payment open for determination by the vessels' owners.
As such, the letter was insufficient to indicate Overseas' intent to pay,
thereby invalidating any contract implied in fact. 92 The disposition of
86. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nay. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, 418 F. Supp. 656,
658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
87. Id. at 658. See note 33 & accompanying text supra.
88. Id. at 660.
89. 218 N.Y. 400, 406-07, 113 N.E. 337, 339 (N.Y. 1916).
90. 418 F. Supp. at 658-59.
91. See note 10 supra for text of the letter.
92. 418 F. Supp. at 659.
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the quasi-contract claim was even more summary because the district
court proceeded on an erroneous conception of quasi-contract. Assuming that misconduct or fault on the part of the party sought to be
charged was a required element of an unjust enrichment claim,93 and
finding none, the court held the facts would not support a full quasicontract recovery. According to the Circuit Court and the Restatement
of Restitution, however, fault or misconduct on the part of the person
94
unjustly enriched need not be present to base a claim in restitution.
Curiously, the court did allow some recovery based on unjust enrichment even without misconduct or fault of Overseas. P&O claimed
$500 of CANBERRA's diversion expense was attributable to Turpin's
hospitalization.95 The court reasoned that if OVERSEAS PROGRESS had been in port when Turpin fell ill, the maritime doctrine of
maintenance and cure 6 would have obligated the ship to pay the expenses of Turpin's hospitalization. Since CANBERRA had hospitalized Turpin after the rescue had been effected, the cost of "custodial
care" was a charge separable from nonrefundable expenses accruing
before or during the life salvage operation. The court realized the inconsistency of finding one expense compensable and the other not, but
in the absence of controlling authority granting reimbursement for life
salvage it was hesitant to break new ground. Instead, the court suggested "appropriately drafted legislation," 97 and offered plaintiffs
whatever solace they might find in upholding "the finest traditions of
the sea."98
The district court's opinion in P&O reflects the life salvor's traditional status in American admiralty courts. The rigor of the common
law has not been effectively ameliorated by the enactment of the Life
Salvage Act.9 9 Indeed, the terms of the statute will often be inapplicable to a life salvage situation, as in P&O.
Section 729 has been interpreted to permit recovery for saving
human life only if the rescuer has foregone an opportunity to perform
property salvage. The common law allows a reward for life salvage
only when the salvor saves valuable property as well as life. Instead, a
rule is needed which will encourage shipowners and seamen to engage
in potentially costly rescue operations by shifting the expense of such
operations to those with the legal obligation to provide them.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 659.
See notes 108-09 & accompanying text infra.
418 F. Supp. at 659.
See notes 104-07 & accompanying text infra.
For a draft of sample legislation, see Jarrett, The Lfe Salvor Problem in Admiraly,
63 YALE L.J. 779, 790-91 (1954).
98. 418 F. Supp. 656, 660.
99. 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1970).
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P&O on Appeal to the Second Circuit
Reversing the decision of the district court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 1°° adopted a very different
view of the facts in P&O. It rejected the lower court's position, and
viewed the situation in terms of CANBERRA's performance of
OVERSEAS PROGRESS' statutory and common law duty under the
doctrine of maintenance and cure to care for its own crewman. In so
doing, the appellate court avoided the life salvage problem altogether.
Seen in this light, CANBERRA's intervention at the request of OVERSEAS PROGRESS constituted a benefit to the latter by making it unnecessary for OVERSEAS PROGRESS to reroute some 740 miles and
fifty-seven hours out of its way to seek hospitalization for its crew
member.10 1 Thus, by sustaining P&O's claim for restitution of CANBERRA's increased fuel cost caused by Turpin's rescue, the Second
Circuit has created a judicial remedy which may greatly reduce the role
of life salvage in modem American admiralty law. While life salvage
may continue to have limited application,1" 2 the solution advanced in
the court's decision provides a partial remedy restoring the life salvor's
expenses which would otherwise be unrecoverable.
The Second Circuit found that the admiralty doctrine of maintenance and cure underpinned OVERSEAS PROGRESS' duty to care
for its seaman. 0 3 Maintenance and cure describes the ship's obligation to provide medical care, food, lodging, and wages for the duration
of the voyage to a crew member injured or falling ill in the vessel's
service. 1" The shipowner's obligation is deep-rooted in maritime law
and is an incident or implied term of a contract for maritime employment. 0 5 If, while on the high seas, a sailor requires immediate medical attention which the facilities of the vessel cannot provide, the ship's
100. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, 553 F.2d 830 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 183 (1977).
101. The extent of this benefit in economic terms was pointed out by P&O on appeal
when counsel estimated that the costs of diverting a 13,030 ton tanker this distance would
have been at least $6,500 plus the cost of getting the ship back on course to its original
destination. Brief for Appellant at 10 n.5. In effect, restitution does not cover all the rescuing vessel's expenses but does spread the costs of rescue more evenly among the vessels
involved.
102. For example, sailing vessels may rescue victims of shipwreck, or small craft may
come to the aid of a vessel in distress at little or no expense.
103. 553 F.2d at 834. P&O's recovery in the appellate court is based on an American
notion of maintenance and cure. Had OVERSEAS PROGRESS been a foreign flag vessel
governed by laws of a state which did not recognize a similar obligation on behalf of a
crewman falling ill in the service of the ship, the ship's obligation to the crewman may have
been very different. See Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 438 (2d Cir. 1949).
104.

2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 539-611 (3d ed. 1970).

105.

Evans v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 382 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1967); see 2 M. NoRRIs,

THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 545 (3d ed. 1970).
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master is bound, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, to have the
crewmember taken to a hospital or put ashore where medical treatment
may be obtained."°6 In the instant case, OVERSEAS PROGRESS
would have been required to pay Turpin the costs of his hospitalization
and treatment as well as the expense of repatriation to the United
States had he been landed in Newfoundland.' 017 Although the doctrine
of maintenance and cure has not traditionally comprehended the modem factor of increased fuel costs, it is consistent with the ship's obligation to pay for medical care for a seaman when the ship itself is
unequipped to do so.
To accommodate this expanded notion of maintenance and cure,
the court drew upon the Restatement of Restitution, section 114, which
provides:
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying a
third person with necessaries ... is entitled to restitution from the
other therefor if (a) he acted unofficiously with intent to charge
therefor, and (b) the things or services supplied were immediately
necessary to prevent serious bodily harm or suffering by such
person.'°s
The court reasoned that because CANBERRA had performed OVERSEAS PROGRESS' manifest duty under maintenance and cure on her
behalf and had put OVERSEAS PROGRESS on notice that this service was not a gratuity, 1" "[t]he circumstances of this case compel application of the rule." ' 10 The fact that OVERSEAS PROGRESS had
actually requested aid made P&O's claim for restitution even
stronger."'
Overseas contended that although principles of quasi-contract reflected equitable principles appropriate to land-based law, their application in the instant case was beyond the admiralty jurisdiction of the
court. Admiralty courts are specially designed forums for the settlement of marine disputes. They are characterized by simple rules of
pleading and procedure and pride themselves on administering justice
by "equitable principles."1' 12 Because of historical strife between com106. "With reference to putting into port, all that can be demanded of the master is the
exercise of reasonable judgment and the ordinary acquaintance of a seaman with the geography and resources of the country. He is not absolutely bound to put into such port if the
cargo be such as would be seriously injured by the delay. Even claims of humanity must be
weighed in a balance with the loss that would probably occur to the owners of the ship and
cargo. A seafaring life is a dangerous one .... " The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 243 (1904).
107. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 25, at 311. See note 103 & accompanying text
supra.
108. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITuTION § 114 (1937).
109. 553 F.2d at 835 n.3.
110. Id. at 835.
111. Id.
112. See, eg., Demsey & Associates, Inc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 500 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir.
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mon law and admiralty courts, 1 3 however, the latter have never en14
joyed the full range of the distinctive remedial powers of equity.
Yet, other legal remedies analogous to quasi-contract, such as salvage' I5 and general average, 1 6 have long been utilized in admiralty.
Indeed, there is evidence that quasi-contractual relief was employed by
English admiralty courts over four centuries ago. 1 7 Whatever doubt
had shrouded the competence of modem American admiralty to dispense quasi-contractual relief was dispelled by Justice Douglas twentythree years ago in Archawski v. Hanioti 118 when he wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court:
Analogous conceptions of rights based on quasi-contract are found in
admiralty. One who saves property at sea has the right to an award
of salvage, regardless of any agreement between him and the owner
....

Rights which admiralty recognizes as serving the ends of jus-

tice are often indistinguishable from ordinary quasi-contractual
1974); Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp., 461 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir.
1972).
113. See, e.g., Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 21-36 (1870) (Bradley, J.).
114. Special remedial powers have been conferred by statute on the admiralty court.
Thus, foreclosure of specified ship mortgages may be decreed. 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1970). In
the majority of nonstatutory maritime cases, however, admiralty is not thought to possess
the distinctive powers of equity. See The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890). Admiralty
may not issue injunctions, Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1975),
nor decree specific performance of contracts, Paterson v. Dakin, 31 F. 682 (S.D. Ala. 1887).
Once admiralty jurisdiction is secured, however, an admiralty court may determine subsidiary or derivative equitable issues. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del
Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1950). See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 33, at 40-43.
115. See note 27 supra.
116. "General average contribution is defined to be a contribution by all the parties in a
sea adventure [in the absence of contract] to make good the loss sustained by one of their
number on account of sacrifices voluntarily made of part of the ship or cargo to save the
residue and the lives of those on board from an impending peril, or for extraordinary expenses necessarily incurred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the
interests embarked in the enterprise." The Star of Hope, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203, 228 (1870).
117. Le Buck v. Van Voisdonck (1554), 2 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS IN THE
COURT OF ADMIRALTY 93 (1897), permitted recovery of prepaid freight. Comment, Present
Status of Quasi-Contractual Relief in Admiralty, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 346 (1935).
118. 350 U.S. 532 (1956). Archawski and its companion case in the Second Circuit,
Sword Line, Inc. v. United States, 228 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955), reh. 230 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.),
affdper cur/am, 351 U.S. 976 (1956), both relied on Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon S.S.
Corp., 290 U.S. 117 (1933). In Krauss, the Court held that an action for recovery of a
freight charge exceeding the contract rate enforced by a lien against the vessel was properly
laid in admiralty. Although the libel read as a cause of action for money had and received-a traditional common law plea-the libelants' remedy could be had in admiralty
because "[a]dmiralty is not concerned with the form of the action, but with its substance."
290 U.S. at 124. The substance of the action was a suit on a maritime contract of affeightment, a subject properly within the jurisdiction of admiralty. See generaly Morrison, The
RemedialPawers ofAdmiralty, 43 YALE L.J. 1 (1933); Chandler, Quasi ContractualRelief in
Admiralty, 27 MICH. L. REv. 23 (1928).
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rights created to prevent unjust enrichment."

9

Taken together, principles of quasi-contract and maintenance and cure
enabled the Second Circuit to compel restitution of CANBERRA's rescue costs.
Overseas Progress' Request
The holding in P&O appears to turn on OVERSEAS PROGRESS' request for assistance:
Since vessels such as OVERSEAS PROGRESS are best able to
avoid unnecessary costs in obtaining medical aid for their crewmen,
we conclude that the owners of such ships are liable for the reasonable value of services rendered by other vessels at their20request, regardless of the value of the benefit actually conferred.'
Logically, however, a request would not be necessary to justify CANBERRA's recovery. It has already been established that the doctrine
of maintenance and cure imposes a duty upon the shipowner to aid 2a
seaman who is injured or becomes ill in the service of the vessel.' '
Similarly, if the vessel is a common carrier, a high standard of care is
owed to its passengers.' 2 2 The principles of restitution relied upon by
the court, however, do not require that one providing emergency services in another's stead do so at the latter's request; rather, the Restatement of Restitution section 114 merely states: "[a] person who has
performed the duty of another. . . [for] a third person. . . although
acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution. . . if. . . [the] services supplied were immediately necessary to
prevent serious bodily harm . . . [to] such person." It therefore appears that even though OVERSEAS PROGRESS' request made CANBERRA's suit more compelling, the request was not legally necessary
to the holding. The result in P&O should be applied to rescue situations whether or not the vessel in distress radioed for assistance.

Conclusion
The holding in P&O may provide courts with a way to avoid the
hoary admiralty doctrine which denies a salvage award for saving
human life. Implicit in the Second Circuit's reversal of P&O is the
notion that the moral recompense for upholding the "finest traditions
of the sea!' is simply insufficient in modern maritime commerce. Admiralty law reflects the essential nature of seagoing business as it has
evolved over centuries, but despite the present vitality of maintenance
and cure, both it and the much excoriated doctrine of life salvage pre119. 350 U.S. at 535-36.
120. 553 F.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
121. See notes 104-10 & accompanying text supra.
122. See 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 27.95 (1977).
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date the era of radio communication and oil-powered ships. Before
the advent of radio, if one ship came upon another in distress on the
high seas and salvaged property or life, it was merely a happy accident,
the salving vessel suffering no more delay than that required for the
service. Historically there was simply no need to reimburse shipowners for extra fuel costs because sail or slave-powered vessels had no
such requirements. Radio communication, and the transmission of
distress signals over wide areas of ocean make the seafaring life a less
dangerous one, 123 but the unavoidable tradeoff is the extra expense of
fuel consumption, as in P&O. Although Overseas argued in the trial
court and on appeal that a ship with a stricken crew member aboard
might be reluctant to seek aid if large expenses could be assessed
against it, 124 this contention approaches the question from only one
side. If smaller vessels summoned large, hospital-equipped ships expecting the latter to render their services gratis, these larger ships would
undoubtedly soon refuse to venture out of their way. Although
OVERSEAS PROGRESS presumably could not anticipate bearing the
full burden of CANBERRA's increased fuel consumption, CANBERRA's relative proximity, speed, and onboard facilities certainly
were considered in selecting her assistance over the other vessels answering OVERSEAS PROGRESS' call. As the court noted, OVERSEAS PROGRESS already had a duty to make reasonable efforts to
aid Turpin; its master's decision to radio for assistance was based on an
evaluation of the costs and benefits available to him.'2 5 Since P&O
establishes that the fuel expenses of the ship rendering assistance is one
of these costs, it will simply become another factor in the captain's decision to seek aid or put into port.
As against the intricacies and pitfalls attending a life salvage
claim, the remedy of restitution on a quasi-contractual theory now offers the life salvor a previously unobtainable recovery. Restitution
does not offer the salvor an award, but the remedy applies to restore
expenses where there has been no simultaneous property salvage or no
property salvage at all. The measure of the life salvor's remedy, furthermore, is relatively simple for the court to ascertain. The Second
Circuit held that CANBERRA was entitled to the "reasonable value"
of its services. 126 Traditionally, one determination of reasonable value
123.

But consider that Lloyd's Register of Shoping reported that the world's merchant

fleets lost 962 ships in 1975, representing almost a million tons. This loss was the second
largest amount ever recorded.

N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1976, at 62, col. 6.

124.

418 F. Supp. at 660; 553 F.2d at 836.
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553 F.2d at 834. See note 101 & accompanying text supra. CANBERRA's rescue

in the instant case represented a considerable cost avoided to OVERSEAS PROGRESS,
given the latter's duty to care for its ailing crewmember. See notes 104-110 & accompanying text supra.
126. 553 F.2d at 836.
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is the market price for obtaining similar services. In the instant case,
however, CANBERRA's dssistance was unique inasmuch as no other
vessel could have served OVERSEAS PROGRESS as quickly and efficiently as it did. The court, therefore, found "the only possible measure of 'reasonable value' is the resonable expense incurred by
CANBERRA as a result of its assistance to Turpin."12 7 The action of a
rescuing vessel will necessarily be unique, however, because there is no
market providing comparable services on the high seas. The "reasonable expense" of any given rescuer ship, furthermore, will vary greatly
in relation to its size and speed.12 To calculate a rescuing ship's recovery on the basis of "benefit conferred" would involve too many
speculative factors, whereas extra fuel costs represent an expense susceptible of ready calculation. For practical reasons, therefore, the
measure of recovery in a life salvage situation, as applied by the Second Circuit, should be the expense attributed to the rescue which reflects the fuel consumed by the vessel's deviation from its original
course and its increased speed.
It is in the light of these policy considerations that _P&O indicates
a new and welcome direction in admiralty law. Allowing vessels to recover their rescue expenses will encourage fully-equipped vessels to
perform their moral duty to fellow sailors aboard ships in distress, and
to seamen who have fallen ill aboard ships without medical facilities
while shifting the financial burden to those with the legal duty to protect the seafarers lives. It will bring the American law of life salvage
into step with the twentieth century.
127.
128.

553 F.2d at 836.
See note 101 & accompanying text supra.

